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DRAFT

7 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Bross

SUBJECT: Comments on your draft Memo of 18 November, entitled: "Adequacy of Present Arrangements for the Development of Estimates on the Plans and Capabilities of Foreign Nations in the Nuclear Field"


1. In the light of our conversation of 3 December, I am taking up the last of the several options you offered me and writing comments directed to your draft memo.



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3. I am not wholly in agreement with the final sentences of your paragraph three, but am willing to go along with your suggestion that we await further evidence before laying on some sort of full-dress investigation of the cause of the error.

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4. While awaiting further returns there are a few things we should keep in mind:

a. Giving more responsibility in the nuclear field to ORR is in itself no solution. If ORR, however, could recruit three or four top-class analysts with an expertise in matters nuclear and if these could be put under the kind of gifted leadership [ ] is capable of giving, we might have something. But I call your attention to the fact that [ ] is right now over-extended and that the three or four gifted analysts I have in mind perhaps might better serve in OSI under [ ] I am no believer in trying to remedy derelictions in our trade by simple bureaucratic and administrative shuffles.

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b. The nuclear side of the intelligence business has been far too well compartmented. This is ascribable in some measure to the highly technical nature of the subject matter. Comparatively few of us could read ourselves into a decent expertise on nuclear matters without a good amount of time and concentrated effort. On the other hand, a great many of us have a fair lay knowledge of the subject.

Per contra, the real nuclear specialists have probably not gained a commensurate lay knowledge in

pertinent phases of life among the nuclear and would-be nuclear powers. For example, I submit that most of such experts do not know as much about the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] strategic thinking, overall military establishment, fundamental economic problems, and foreign policy outlook as they should.

What I am getting at is that those of us who deal with the whole range of problems of members and would-be members of the nuclear club improve our expertise in technical nuclear matters, and that the nuclear specialists in OSI and JAEIC broaden their own horizons. One obvious first step would be to insist that each side begin forthwith to attend the other side's meetings.

c. Some time along the line I most urgently hope that someone can find out precisely the scale and nature of the AEC's intelligence effort. The AEC has of course had a seat on the USIB and its predecessor organization since I came to work in 1950. Its positive contribution to nuclear intelligence problems is very sketchy in my mind. I have a feeling that the number of bodies in the AEC committed 100 percent to intelligence work is very small indeed. I have a feeling that the

AEC's very considerable expertise in nuclear matters is very largely brought to bear on an ad hoc basis. One of the best contributions the AEC has made in recent years to National Intelligence Estimates was produced not in the AEC itself but by the Commission's contractors. Its production required a matter of months.

5. As to your suggestion to expand the nuclear competence of ONE by adding one member to the Staff and perhaps another member to the Board, I have mixed feelings. If we could get exactly the right people and the Director were willing to expand our TO, I would be an enthusiastic backer. Expansions of TOs in present circumstances are frequently more difficult than appear at first glance. But I wish to be on record as saying that we could not use two of our present professional slots for this purpose.

There would be no difficulty in absorbing 100 percent of the time of the Staffer on purely nuclear matters. It would be more difficult to justify using a Board member full-time. Perhaps a better way of putting it would be to say that we have greater need on the Board for a senior scientist with a general scientific competence than a more narrowly based atomic physicist.

The ideal man would be one who could easily get on top of nuclear problems and who as well could lend a sure professional hand with the whelter of scientific and technical matters we are now dealing with. To name the most important: biological and chemical weaponry, space, missilery, electronics, lasers, etc.

draft

SHERMAN KENT